The Washington Treaty for Naval Disarmament (1922)
Above, delegates to the Washington Conference on Naval Disarmament meet at the DAR's Constitution Hall, c. 1922. In the aftermath of World War I, with the world's peoples crying out for healing and a turning away from war and arms races, naval planners in the victor countries were getting ready for an even more extreme arms race. England, the U.S. and Japan all had several new classes of battleship either being built or on the drawing boards. The U.S. had laid down 4 new battlecruisers and 4 superbattleships to go with them. The British were contemplating battleships with eight 18" guns, laid out somewhat like the later Nelson and Rodney with the engines and main superstructure at the stern; while Japan had already completed its 700-foot behemoths Nagato and Mutsu, armed with 16" guns, and was about to launch an 8-battleship, 8-battlecruiser building program. Not surprisingly, Japan was spending fully 40% of its GNP on its navy. With these countries being allied in the late War and all pinched for funds to pay off monumental borrowing to wage the war, it seemed timely to approach naval disarmament. The effort was entered into in good faith and actually produced a decade of very moderate naval expenditure and loose compliance with the terms of the Treaty.
Although the U.S. had the wherewithal to escalate the arms race, the country relapsed into isolationism and disillusion with international involvement following WWI. The administration of Warren G. Harding invited delegates to Washington for a Conference on Naval Disarmament starting in June 1921. With Germany eliminated as a first-rate naval Power by the Treaty of Versailles (and the scuttling of its interned fleet at Scapa Flow), Britain and the U.S. were by far the dominant navies, with Japan making great exertions to catch up. France and Italy were minor players by comparison. Russia was embroiled in civil war, its fleet largely ignored and left in ill repair; like Germany she was no longer a great naval Power.
Thus the problem was how to soothe the Japanese and reach an agreeable ratio of vessels. For the first time, Britain dropped her 2:1 doctrine (that Britain must have sufficient capital ships to fight the next two largest navies put together). In the end it was agreed that Britain and America would operate at parity in the size of their fleets (525,000 tons of capital ships apiece), while Japan would agree to 315,000 tons. This ratio was cited as "5:5:3." On this scale, under the terms of the treaty, France and Italy settled for 1⅔ each, not without considerable grumbling. The Treaty was signed in 1922. In this country, it was ratified by the Senate and signed into law in February 1923.
Of course there was more to this agreement than meets the eye on such a quick explanation. Some of the fine points of the treaty: A moratorium was declared on new battleship construction unless balanced by removal of existing units to meet the tonnage requirements. There was a ban on erecting new, or improving old fortifications on land (very attractive to the Japanese); also the British and Americans agreed to limit their forces deployed in Asia so that Japan would at all times be the preponderant naval Power in its home waters. It was legal to refit older ships within limits laid down in the treaty. Lastly, aircraft carrier construction limits were laid down but (since there were only a few small carriers in any fleet in 1923) this diverted some of the wealth and energy that otherwise might have been expended on new generations of dreadnoughts. Indeed, most of the first generation of full-size carriers were built on the hulls of canceled battlecruisers.
The signatories each got to build new warships upon notifying the other signatories of intent, size and power of the ships anticipated. New capital ship construction was permitted after 1930. The treaty assumed that it or a similar framework would continue to be desirable and built in a new conference (the London Conference) in 1930, two years before the Washington Treaty was to lapse. For good or ill, the Treaty defined an era. There were no battleships laid down in the U.S. between the completion of the Colorado in 1923 and the commissioning of the North Carolina in 1939 -- what a contrast to the WWI years, when U.S. shipyards laid down 2 to 4 new battleships every year. Treaty battleships were notoriously smallish and cramped. As the fascist régimes came into their heyday in the 30s, cheating on limits became common, although Britain, France, and the U.S. continued to abide by treaty limits right until war was declared. In 1936 the Second London Conference ended in disarray after the Japanese announced they were repudiating the terms, and the Treaty era was clearly on the wane. However, the arms race had been held in check for some 15 years, no doubt contributing to the famous peace and prosperity of the Twenties.
Although the U.S. had the wherewithal to escalate the arms race, the country relapsed into isolationism and disillusion with international involvement following WWI. The administration of Warren G. Harding invited delegates to Washington for a Conference on Naval Disarmament starting in June 1921. With Germany eliminated as a first-rate naval Power by the Treaty of Versailles (and the scuttling of its interned fleet at Scapa Flow), Britain and the U.S. were by far the dominant navies, with Japan making great exertions to catch up. France and Italy were minor players by comparison. Russia was embroiled in civil war, its fleet largely ignored and left in ill repair; like Germany she was no longer a great naval Power.
Thus the problem was how to soothe the Japanese and reach an agreeable ratio of vessels. For the first time, Britain dropped her 2:1 doctrine (that Britain must have sufficient capital ships to fight the next two largest navies put together). In the end it was agreed that Britain and America would operate at parity in the size of their fleets (525,000 tons of capital ships apiece), while Japan would agree to 315,000 tons. This ratio was cited as "5:5:3." On this scale, under the terms of the treaty, France and Italy settled for 1⅔ each, not without considerable grumbling. The Treaty was signed in 1922. In this country, it was ratified by the Senate and signed into law in February 1923.
Of course there was more to this agreement than meets the eye on such a quick explanation. Some of the fine points of the treaty: A moratorium was declared on new battleship construction unless balanced by removal of existing units to meet the tonnage requirements. There was a ban on erecting new, or improving old fortifications on land (very attractive to the Japanese); also the British and Americans agreed to limit their forces deployed in Asia so that Japan would at all times be the preponderant naval Power in its home waters. It was legal to refit older ships within limits laid down in the treaty. Lastly, aircraft carrier construction limits were laid down but (since there were only a few small carriers in any fleet in 1923) this diverted some of the wealth and energy that otherwise might have been expended on new generations of dreadnoughts. Indeed, most of the first generation of full-size carriers were built on the hulls of canceled battlecruisers.
The signatories each got to build new warships upon notifying the other signatories of intent, size and power of the ships anticipated. New capital ship construction was permitted after 1930. The treaty assumed that it or a similar framework would continue to be desirable and built in a new conference (the London Conference) in 1930, two years before the Washington Treaty was to lapse. For good or ill, the Treaty defined an era. There were no battleships laid down in the U.S. between the completion of the Colorado in 1923 and the commissioning of the North Carolina in 1939 -- what a contrast to the WWI years, when U.S. shipyards laid down 2 to 4 new battleships every year. Treaty battleships were notoriously smallish and cramped. As the fascist régimes came into their heyday in the 30s, cheating on limits became common, although Britain, France, and the U.S. continued to abide by treaty limits right until war was declared. In 1936 the Second London Conference ended in disarray after the Japanese announced they were repudiating the terms, and the Treaty era was clearly on the wane. However, the arms race had been held in check for some 15 years, no doubt contributing to the famous peace and prosperity of the Twenties.
HMS Duke of York and her 2 sisters in the King George VI class showed some of the disadvantages of building to Treaty standards. Britain's premier new battleships for WWII were awkward, cramped ships. Low to the water, they were wet below decks. Because of weight constraints, designers gave them 14" guns at a time when all competitive navies were mounting 15 to 18" weapons; and again, the weight of a superfiring quad turret, as originally designed, was too much for the ships' stability. So they all carried a twin superfiring turret forward, for a total of ten big guns. For all their drawbacks, this class compiled an honorable record of wartime service, helping to sink the Hipper and the Bismarck among other notable exploits.
HMS Duke of York and her 2 sisters in the King George VI class showed some of the disadvantages of building to Treaty standards. Britain's premier new battleships for WWII were awkward, cramped ships. Low to the water, they were wet below decks. Because of weight constraints, designers gave them 14" guns at a time when all competitive navies were mounting 15 to 18" weapons; and again, the weight of a superfiring quad turret, as originally designed, was too much for the ships' stability. So they all carried a twin superfiring turret forward, for a total of ten big guns. For all their drawbacks, this class compiled an honorable record of wartime service, helping to sink the Hipper and the Bismarck among other notable exploits.