John Campbell is a retired metallurgist who now devotes all his time to writing. Primarily known as an expert on ordnance, his knowledge of the technical side of naval history is extensive. He is the author of a Warship Monograph on the Queen Elizabeth class (Conway Maritime Press) and a forthcoming Warship Special on battlecruisers.
Few naval battles, apart from Jutland, have been more often described than the battle of Tsushima, the culminating action of the Russo-Japanese war at sea. Yet no account appreciates the real puzzle of the battle: how the Japanese managed to annihilate the Russian fleet with only 446 12-inch shells from their most powerful guns. In the following essay, Mr Campbell reveals the secret.
Rozhdestvensky kept his fleet closed up during the night of 26 - 27 May... [Sir Julian] Corbett, who is critical of the details of the Japanese watch in his unpublished account of the battle, considers that with a little luck, he [Rozhdestvensky] would have passed through their cruiser patrols undetected. The hospital ship Orel was out of station and this led to her discovery by the auxiliary cruiser Shinano Maru. This latter ship then located other units of the Russian fleet and made the sighting signal by wireless at 0450. Other Japanese cruisers gathered to watch the Russians but there was much mist and irregular visibility, and information that the Russian battleships changed from their night formation to single line ahead was never passed to Togo, who had put to sea at 0710. There was a strong WSW wind (Force 5 to 7) in the Straits, and a rough sea until late in the evening, so that most of the Japanese torpedo-boats were sent to take shelter until later in the day. The 9th TB Division which had modern, 147-ft Normand type boats, recorded that they shot about like rockets, rolled through an angle of over 60°, and at 15 knots or over seemed almost submarines. Haze and mist limited visibility to a distance of 10,000 - 12,000 yards, and objects were often indistinct at half that distance.
Meanwhile, at 0930 Rozhdestvensky signaled his twelve ships of the battle-line into line ahead with the Oleg, Aurora and Donskoi astern. The fleet train was in a second line to starboard of the Oleg, with the Svietlana, Almaz, and Ural astern and the Monomakh on the starboard flank. The Zhemchug and Izumrud, each with two destroyers, were to starboard of the [flagship] Suvorov and Osliabya, respectively, and the remaining five destroyers were with the Oleg and Svietlana. At 1142 the Ushakov, or according to some accounts the Orel, opened fire on the Japanese 3rd Division (light cruisers) at about 9,000 yards, and the other ships of Nebogatov's division also opened fire. About 30 rounds were fired before Rozhdestvensky, whose battle orders had fixed 6,000 yards as the maximum range, stopped the firing. The Japanese 3rd Division consisted of the Kasagi (Vice-Admiral Dewa), Chitose, and the smaller cruisers Otowa and Niitaka. They had missed contact with the Russians earlier, going too far to the south, and were to port of the Russians and on an ENE course when fire was opened. Only the Kasagi and Chitose replied and the Japanese drew off into the mist.
Rozhdestvensky, for reasons which are not clear, decided to form his 1st Division into line abreast; or perhaps his intention was to form all 12 ships into a single line abreast. The 1st Division turned in succession 8 points to starboard but, instead of then turning together 8 points to port to form line abreast, they turned again in succession thus forming a second line ahead, to starboard of the other eight ships. It is not certain whether the manoeuvre was misunderstood by the Alexander, astern of the Suvorov, or if it was annulled by Rozhdestvensky, as his ships had become visible to the Japanese on entering a less misty area. At any rate the line of four Russian ships turned somewhat to port and increased speed to take station again ahead of the other eight and at 1408 when the battle began in earnest, all but the Orel, which was to starboard of the Osliabya, had got back into the van.
Chart of Approach
At 1339 Togo, who was then about 10 miles NW of Okinoshima, sighted the Russian fleet, faintly discernible to the SW in the mist which now allowed visibility to 14,000 - 16,000 yards. The Russian course was NE by N and Togo followed by Kamimura, steered NW by N and then W. At 1357 the Russians bore S by W 10,000 - 14,000 yards off. The Japanese note that the yellow funnels of the Russian ships were very easy to see and a good aiming mark, and the Russian painting, which incorporated blackish hulls and funnel tops with these funnels, was certainly at a disadvantage as compared with the Japanese uniform grey colour. At 1402 Togo altered course to SW by S and it appeared that he intended to pass the Russian fleet on a reverse course, but at 1405 he turned his division in succession to port on to an ENE course to press the Russian van. At this time the leading Russians were steaming nearly NE by N and bore S by E at about 8,500 - 9,000 yards range, and at 1408 when only the [flagship] Mikasa had settled on her new course and the Shikishima was about to do so, the Suvorov opened from her fore turret at 7,400 yards, the shot falling 20 yards astern of the Mikasa, and other leading Russian ships immediately followed, concentrating on the two leading Japanese.
In thus turning his ships at a fixed point within range of the Russian van, Togo ran some risk, but it was less than it might seem at first sight. The bearings were such that initially the Russian after turrets could not train, the last five ships of their line were out of range, and the Orel was on the beam of the Osliabya which had to slow to allow her to get ahead. The two Japanese ships were thus under the fire of ten 12-inch and two 10-inch guns only, and it was improbable that at over 7,000 yards they would all find the range at once. Kamimura's division, following Togo, would have run more risk but he turned a little to starboard before making his turn to port which was thus made at a greater distance from the Russians, and by that time the fire of the leading Japanese ships was beginning to take effect.
The Mikasa opened fire on the Suvorov at 1410 at 7,000 yards and as they steadied on the new course, the other ships of Togo's and Kamimura's divisions followed so that by 1420 all were firing. The Iwate and possibly the Kasuga and Nisshin had in fact opened fire before turning. Initially the Mikasa, Asahi, and Azuma fired at the Suvorov, and the rest at the Osliabya, easy to identify by her three funnels; but targets were altered and of the battleships, the Fuji changed to the Suvorov soon after 1420. The Russians mostly fired at the Mikasa and also at some of the armoured cruisers. The rough seas washed into windward main deck gun-ports and gave a good deal of motion to the ships making it difficult to lay the guns. However, the Japanese quickly found the range and maintained a highly accurate but usually slow fire. The Russian shooting too, was good in the early stages of the action. The courses of the two fleets were roughly parallel and to the north of east, but the Japanese were doing 15 knots as compared to the Russian 10, and the latter were gradually forced to starboard. The range was mostly 5,500 - 6,500 yards and not below 4,700 - 5,000 yards. Rozhdestvensky apparently considered an attempt to get to closer range, but it does not seem that it was ever made. By 1435 Togo was steering due E and by 1443, ESE, and four minutes later a little further to the south, threatening to cross the 'T' of the Russian line.
By this time the Russians were in grave trouble. At about 1418 the Osliabya had been hit by a heavy shell on or below the waterline forward which made a large hole and caused very serious flooding. Another shell pierced the armour amidships and entered a coal bunker, and here again serious flooding occurred. The ship took a heavy list to port and was down by the head, and counter-flooding and hole-stopping attempts were unsuccessful. In addition the fore turret had been hit and put out of action and she was badly on fire so that the Shikishima at 1440 could not lay her guns on the Osliabya for smoke. At 1450 the Osliabya turned to starboard out of line and at almost the same time was hit again on the waterline by two heavy shells, one of which made a second huge hole close to the first bad hit.
The Suvorov was frequently hit early in the action and by 1420 was on fire. This apparently started from the fore chart-house and became very violent. By 1435 Rozhdestvensky and her captain had been wounded by splinters entering the conning tower and at 1440 the Suvorov was temporarily hidden from the Japanese in smoke. Rozhdestvensky was again wounded and flames drove into the conning tower, making it untenable, and the ship had to be directed from lower fighting stations. A 4-point turn to starboard had been ordered, but the helm jammed so that the turn could not be stopped, and at about 1452 the Suvorov turned out of the line and continued round to starboard until she could be steered by her engines. There had been a large explosion in the after 12-inch turret, which ceased firing, and the after funnel had fallen, but her condition was not as critical as the Osliabya's.
These two ships were the main Japanese targets, but visibility was frequently impaired by mist and smoke; at about 1435 Togo's division reported that they could only see the battle-flags at the Russian trucks: and other ships were also engaged. According to the British observer in the Asahi, the Alexander was hit several times early in the action, and she was also soon on fire. After the Suvorov was hidden in smoke at 1440, she became the target for several ships and seems to have been badly on fire. The Borodino had a bad hit at about 1430 according to the British observer in Asahi. For a short time she subsequently left the line, perhaps due to a machinery or steering defect, and with the Orel and Osliabya masked each other's fire. The Borodino seems to have regained her station at 1450 or a little after. The Orel was certainly hit a number of times in this phase of the battle but her injuries were not vital. The Sissoi or perhaps the Navarin were set on fire, but do not seem to have been badly hit up to 1450, and the ships astern of them do not appear to have been engaged by the Japanese except that the Iwate fired at the Nikolai for a time.
The Mikasa had been hit by six 12-inch and nineteen 6-inch shells between 1410 and 1450, but her fighting power was virtually unaffected. Of these hits, five 12-inch and fourteen 6-inch had been made between 1410 and 1425. A few unimportant hits had been made on the other three battleships, while the Kasuga had one 12-inch hit at 1433, and at 1440 the right fore 8-inch gun in Nisshin was cut in two by a 12-inch shell. All Kamimura's armoured cruisers had been hit and the Azuma's 8-inch gun right aft had been put out of action by a 12-inch shell at 1450, but the only ship seriously affected was the Asama. At 1428 a 12-inch shell had struck her on the starboard quarter, and the shock of impact had put the steering gear temporarily out of action. At the time she was turning to port and she thus fell out of the line. Repairs were completed in six minutes, but the other Japanese ships had vanished in the mist and the Asama put on full speed to rejoin them. For a time the Russian ships fired heavily at her but no serious hits were made until 1500, shortly before she made contact with the Japanese again.
When the Suvorov turned to starboard and left the line, the Alexander at first followed her, but then led on an easterly course, until at 1455 her captain turned suddenly to port and headed northwards followed by the other ships. This manoeuvre caused Togo to turn his division 8 points to port together at 1457, and a further 8 points together at 1505, thus coming into line ahead in reverse order, the Nisshin leading on a WNW course, to block the Russian northward movement. Kamimura however, seeing that the Russians were becoming disordered and apparently about to turn to starboard, continued on the previous course at an increased speed of 17 knots, masking the fire of Togo's ships as he passed across their sterns, and it was not until 1510 that he turned 8 points to port in succession, followed by another 8 points to port at 1516.
In this period the range was reduced, Kamimura's division closing to about 3300 yards which had increased by the time his turn was made. His main target was apparently the Alexander, but the Sissoi and probably Navarin [also] were fired at, as well as the Osliabya. The latter was now sinking with an increasing list. The sea entered her main deck ports and then the bases of her funnels, and by 1510 the Osliabya had gone down without capsizing, her deck nearly vertical. Russian destroyers rescued 385 survivors but 514 were lost.
Most of Togo's division ceased fire while making their turns, but a number of 12-inch hits were made on the Japanese, of which the most important were one on the Fuji at 1500 and two on the isolated Asama at the same time. The hit on the Fuji pierced the after barbette shield and burst inside, causing a cordite fire and putting the right gun out of action. The Asama was hit by two 12-inch shells on the starboard side aft, 5 ft above water. These caused serious flooding and her draught was presently increased to 5 ft over the proper figure aft.
So far no torpedo attacks had been made though 17 Japanese destroyers were on the disengaged side of the battle divisions, and the four equipped with mines, had recently joined them. At 1506, however, the torpedo-gunboat Chihaya attached to Kamimura's division, fired two Winch torpedoes at 2,700 yards at a ship which seems to have been the Orel. Neither hit, as might be expected. At about this time the Zhemchug steamed towards the rear of Kamimura's division and the head of Togo's, but was driven off by the Iwate, Nisshin and Kasuga at about 3,300 yards before she could launch her torpedoes.
Togo did not yet know that the Osliabya had sunk, though ships of Kamimura's division had seen her go down, the Iwate mistaking her for a [Novik] class cruiser. He must however have known that victory was assured, provided the Russian fleet did not escape northwards in the mist and fog. The next 22 hours of the battle were governed by Russian efforts to break through to the north and the Japanese countermoves.
The visibility had deteriorated as much smoke combined with the mist and for the most part did not exceed 6,000 or 7,000 yards at best.
The Japanese were now steaming approximately WNW with Togo's division leading in reverse order. The Asama soon made contact again and at 1515 took station ahead of the Nisshin. The Russian fleet had been in disorder since 1500 or a little after, and the details of the movements of the various ships are not known. The Alexander broke off her northward advance and turned sharply to starboard, and the surviving three ships of the Russian 2nd Division fell astern so that Nebogatov's 3rd Division took their station next to the Orel. Togo opened fire on the Russians, who were now on the port side of the Japanese, at 1507, Kamimura's division joining in at 1520. The ranges varied from 5,000 - 6,000 yards down to 3,000 or less to the main body of the Russian ships, while the Suvorov, which was to the westward of the other Russian ships, was engaged at 1520 for a time by the Shikishima, and apparently the Mikasa, at under 2,500 yards. At 1535 she suddenly appeared out of the fog on the port beam of Kamimura's ships and was engaged for five minutes by all five at down to 2,000 yards or less. Apart from the Suvorov, the Japanese targets cannot be all identified and they were frequently obscured in mist and smoke. The leading Russian ship, believed to be still the Alexander (though according to some accounts she fell out temporarily and the Borodino led) was engaged by the Mikasa and other ships, and the Sissoi, at which the Fuji reported firing for a time, also appears to have been attacked. The Mikasa fired an 18-inch torpedo at 1521 at a ship which seems to have been the Suvorov, and at about 1535 the Yakumo and the Azuma each fired one 18-inch [torpedo] at her. None of these three torpedoes hit.
By 1530 the Russians were vanishing in the mist on the port quarter of Togo's division, and he ordered the Nisshin to alter course 4 points to port. At 1542 he turned simultaneously 8 points to port, and then again at 1549, thus bringing the Mikasa back to the lead on a northeasterly course. At 1547 Kamimura turned his division in line ahead to starboard and took up a position on Togo's port bow. The Russian ships, apart from the Suvorov, had meanwhile steamed SE from about 1530 and then at 1540 turned approximately NNE, so that another encounter was imminent.
It seems likely that the Alexander III received much of the damage, which was eventually to prove fatal, in the action described above. At 1525 the Izumo reported that her target, which was probably the Alexander, had a considerable list to port, and by about 1540 it appears that she was no longer leading the Russian line. The Sissoi and Orel were also probably damaged, while the Suvorov was in a bad way. Her fore 12-inch turret was put out of action, Rozhdestvensky was again seriously wounded and unconscious, and the British observer in the Azuma reported that she was down by the bow with a heavy list to port, with no foremast or after funnel and only a ragged half of the fore funnel left. He adds that she was one mass of thick grey smoke from forecastle to mainmast, but still firing some after guns. At 1539 the torpedo gunboat Chihaya closed the Suvorov to 1,750 yards and fired two 14-inch torpedoes, one of which was claimed as a hit, though the Suvorov's condition showed no visible change. At 1545 the 5th Destroyer Division also attacked the Suvorov at 450 to 900 yards, and five 18-inch torpedoes were fired. It seems probable that no hits were made. The Chihaya was hit by a shell just above the waterline and had to make emergency repairs, and the destroyer division leader had a 3-inch shell in one boiler. These shells may have come from other Russian battleships, rather than the Suvorov.
Of the Japanese armoured ships the Mikasa was hit by a 12-inch shell, as were the Shikishima, Fuji and Nisshin. Hits were also made on most of Kamimura's division, but no very important damage was caused to any of the Japanese armoured ships in this phase of the battle.
At 1555 Togo caught sight of the Russian main force again, now bearing east by south and 7,500 - 8,000 yards away, and at 1601 the Mikasa opened fire at the third Russian ship at a range of 7,100 yards. The other ships of the 1st Division, as well as the 2nd Division ahead, opened within the next few minutes, and the Mikasa changed to the leading ship at 1603. The Russians were now apparently in the order: Borodino, Orel, Alexander, Nikolai, Apraksin, Senyavin, Sissoi, Navarin, Nakhimov, and Ushakov, the last named having a large shell hole forward. The Russian line was gradually forced southward and by 1624 the Japanese were steering approximately east. In a few minutes the Russians headed southwards and disappeared in the mist.
The Suvorov meanwhile had steamed to the northeast and once more found herself between the two fleets. The Mikasa opened a heavy fire on her at 1608, and other ships of Togo's division followed at a range which fell from 6100 to 2200 yards. Some of Kamimura's ships also fired at her and the Japanese 1st Division reported that tongues of flame were issuing from main deck gun-ports, and that she resembled an island volcano in eruption. At about 1630 the British observer in Asahi saw a 12-inch shell burst between decks, close to the after 6-inch turret. Flames spouted 50 ft from the side, the stump of her main-topmast fell and at the same instant there was a considerable explosion. Until then she was still occasionally firing from an after turret, but now only one or two of the stern 3-inch guns still fired. She showed no signs of sinking, however, and the British observer in the Azuma thought that she was less down by the bow at 1620 than an hour previously. The Mikasa had fired an 18-inch torpedo at 1618 and another at 1624, while the Shikishima fired one at 1632, but none hit.
Apart from the Suvorov it is impossible to identify the Japanese targets, and ranges appear to have been always over 4000 yards to the main body of the Russian ships. It cannot be stated with any certainty how much damage was done to them in this period of the action, but the Alexander was undoubtedly the ship in worst state, other than the Suvorov.
The Mikasa was hit by a 12-inch shell at 1615, and the Nisshin by a heavy shell at 1605 which sent splinters into the conning tower and wounded Vice Admiral Misu. Some of the 2nd Division were also hit, and the unlucky Asama, which had sighted her own Division at about 1550 and steamed ahead on the disengaged side of the 1st Division to regain her proper station. She was so slowed by her previous damage aft and by a 6-inch shell through the base of the after funnel, which reduced the boiler furnace-draught, that she did not take station astern of the Iwate until 1705. Apart from the Russian hits, the right fore 12-inch gun failed in Shikishima at 1615, and the turret roof was damaged and the left gun also put out of action for a time.
At 1635 Togo turned his division 8 points to port simultaneously, to forestall any attempt to escape north round the Japanese rear, but no such movements developed and at 1643 he turned 8 points together to starboard back into line ahead. The Russians had now completely vanished in smoke and haze, and at 1651 Togo altered course to due south. Meanwhile Kamimura, in the van, had altered course to approximately SE at 1635 and to nearly due S at 1642, but fearing to lose touch with Togo, he turned back onto a northwesterly course at 1647. At this time he heard firing far to the south, and soon, seeing that Togo's division had turned onto a southward course, he again turned in that direction and took station on the port bow of the 1st division.
At 1643 Togo had ordered the 4th Destroyer Division to attack and they made for the Suvorov at 18 knots. This division -- which was to accomplish more in the battle than any other destroyer division -- was the one fitted for minelaying ... Each destroyer carried eight mines with 100-lb charges in addition to her usual armament of two 18-inch torpedo tubes and four torpedoes. The division comprised the Asagiri and Murasame, built in Japan, and the Asashio and Shirakumo, built by Thornycroft. All four were 375-ton boats with designed speeds of 29-31 knots, but a ricochet had hit the Murasame at 1410 and reduced her speed to 20 knots. The Suvorov was blazing, with flames shooting out of the upper deck and sides, but was still steaming roughly WNW at about 10 knots and was sufficiently under control to turn her head quickly to starboard when the destroyers were seen on the port side.
At 1705 the Asagiri and Murasame each fired one torpedo at 650 yards and the Asashio immediately followed with two, but the rough seas striking the sides of the torpedoes as they entered the water, made them inaccurate. The Asagiri and Murasame again attacked on an opposite course at 350 yards and though the Asagiri's torpedo misfired, that launched by the Murasame hit the Suvorov on the port quarter. She suddenly listed about 10°, but showed no signs of sinking; ... although only one shell hit the Asagiri without causing much damage, the fire of the Suvorov's one or two remaining 3-inch guns was reinforced by that of other Russian ships. As a result the Shirakumo did not fire any torpedoes, nor did the 3rd Destroyer Division, which had been intended to make a subsequent attack; this division was fired at by Russian ships at 3,300 yards.
Under Togo's plan, his twelve light cruisers, with the three Matsushima class and the Chin-Yen which comprised Vice-Admiral Kataoka's 5th Division, were to attack the Russian cruisers and fleet train to the rear of their battleships. This action had been going on since about 1445, though Kataoka's ships did not engage for two hours, and its details are not relevant to the major fight between the armoured ships. It must be noted however that from about 1410 to 1420 some of the Japanese light cruisers had fired at the leading Russian battleships at 6,000 - 9,000 yards, and that at about 1645 some of the Russian battleships driven south in the main action, engaged the Japanese light cruisers for 15 or 20 minutes at about 4,500 - 9,000 yards without doing very much damage. The Takachiho, which had been repairing previous damage and was separated from the other light cruisers, had a brush with Russian battleships at 1720 when the range was 9,400 yards, and Kataoka's 5th Division may also have had a short engagement with them at about 1710.
Since 1651 Togo had been steaming south and at 1700 two Borodino class battleships were sighted to the southwest on a northerly course. The Russian ships opened fire at 7,200 yards to which the Mikasa immediately replied and the other ships of the 1st Division followed. The Fuji reported a range of 5,200 yards at 1707 but this then increased, and the Russians disappeared in the mist soon afterwards. Togo did not turn north after them at this stage, but continued to the south firing at various targets dimly seen through the mist. The armed liner Ural, disabled and abandoned in the cruiser fighting previously, was the most visible of these. The Japanese were now facing the evening sun, and [visibility] conditions were probably better from the Russian line as the Nisshin was hit by a 12-inch shell at 1720 which cut [her] left after 8-inch gun in two. Why Togo did not immediately turn after the Borodino class ships is not clear, but by 1728 he concluded that the main body of the Russians were to the north of him, and turned his division on to a NNW course. In point of fact the Russian battleships, led by the Borodino and Orel, had turned on to a northwesterly course, and Togo had been steaming in roughly the opposite direction.
Meanwhile Kamimura's division ahead had fired at various targets in the mist and fog, and hearing firing on the starboard bow, had altered course in that direction. His ships intervened in fighting between the Japanese and Russian cruisers, and soon after 1730 went in chase of some of the latter to the southwest, thus parting company with Togo's division for the time being.
Since the attack of the 4th Destroyer Division, the Suvorov seems to have steamed southward at 4-5 knots and the Russian destroyer Buiny, crowded with survivors from the Osliabya at about 1730 or a little later, took off Rozhedestvensky, who was only intermittently conscious, and also some of his staff. Nebogatov was apparently never formally notified that the command had passed to him, though he received Rozhedestvensky's orders to make for Vladivostok on a course N 230 E. The destroyer Biedovy is said to have been sent to take off the rest of the Suvorov's crew, but this was never done.
Though much damage had been inflicted on the Russian battleships at small cost to his own, Togo cannot have felt very satisfied with the position at 1730, but the last two hours of the daylight battle were to end in the assurance of a great victory. During this period of the battle the 1st and 2nd Japanese Divisions were not in company until the end and Kamimura's ships contributed little to the action with the main Russian force.
After Togo's turn at 1728, his division maintained a generally NNW course until 1752. They fired at the derelict Ural and at the repair ship Kamchatka, which was also disabled, and both the Mikasa and Shikishima fired a torpedo at the Ural, the latter of which hit at 2,400 yards, and in a few minutes the Ural went down. At 1752 Togo altered course to WNW, but sighting some Russian destroyers which appeared to be intending an attack, he temporarily turned to the NE at 1756 until they were driven off by the Mikasa's fire. At 1757 two Borodino class battleships were seen in the WNW, steaming northwards and 6,900 yards away, and at 1800 Togo turned onto a NNW course again and opened fire.
The Russian fleet had now reformed with the cruisers and destroyers, as well as the surviving fleet train, on the disengaged side. The armoured ships were in order as follows: Borodino, Orel, Nikolai, Apraksin, Senyavin, Alexander, Sissoi, Navarin, Ushakov, Nakhimov. The Alexander was to starboard of the Senyavin and there were gaps between the Orel and Nikolai and between the Senyavin and Sissoi*. At first the Japanese concentrated on the Borodino and the range fell slowly to 6,000 yards at 1825. The setting sun was shining on the sea, and the fall of shot could not be seen so that the Japanese firing became slower. Soon conditions for the Japanese apparently improved and at 1833 the Mikasa noted a good many hits on the Borodino. She was hidden in smoke and some ships changed target to the Orel which was shooting accurately, the spray from her near-misses often drenching the bridges of the Japanese ships. The Russians had begun to edge off to the westward, and the range had risen to 7,200 yards at 1842, causing the Japanese to turn onto a NW course at 1845. The Russians however turned further to port and the range gradually increased so that the Japanese 6-inch guns ceased firing, the main armament continuing a slow and accurate fire.
Although the Borodino was the principal target, the Mikasa reporting her on fire at 1840 and Captain Pakenham, the British observer in the Asahi, seeing a very conspicuous hit at 1857 when the range was 8,400 yards, the first ship to fall out was the Alexander. The Japanese state that the 1st Division fired only at the Borodino and Orel in this action, except that the Kasuga occasionally fired at other ships, and though it is possible that targets were mistaken and that the Alexander was fired at for a short time when the Russian line first turned away westward, it seems likely that her falling out was as a result of continued flooding from injuries received in the earlier part of the battle. Russian witnesses in other ships say that her bows were nearly destroyed and there was a huge hole in the port side forward. A very large fire was also raging on the boat deck, and the Alexander began to fall astern, flying the distress signal, and with a heavy list to port. She temporarily recovered and returned to the line astern of the Senyavin, but shortly before 1900 again turned out of the line to port, and at 1900 or a few minutes after, suddenly capsized and sank with all hands. The Borodino's end was not to be long delayed. At 1904 the Mikasa reported that her mainmast had fallen and that there was a large fire, and at 1918 when the range was 9,000 yards two 12-inch shells fired by the Shikishima hit. Pakenham relates that flame burst from her after battery and leaping to a height of at least 30 ft, at once gained possession of the whole breadth of the ship and seemed to be working forward rapidly. Her after turret was now silent. It was already twilight and after a few more shots, the Mikasa turned due north at 1923 and ceased fire. As the Fuji reached the turning point her last 12-inch shot produced the sensation of the day. In Pakenham's words:
Entering the upper part of the Borodino near the foremost broadside turret, it burst, and an immense column of smoke, ruddied on its underside by the glare from the explosion and from the fire abaft, spurted to the height of her funnel tops. From every opening in engine-rooms and stokeholds steam rushed and in two or three minutes, the ship from foremast to stem was wrapped in fiercely whirling spirals of smoke and vapour, gaily illumined by frequent tall shafts of flame. it was evident that the conflagration had reached a stage where it could defy control, and that the vessel's fighting days were numbered, though even so it was not realised how near was the end. Though sudden, this was not dramatic. While all watched, the unfortunate ship disappeared, her departure only marked by a roar not greatly louder than that of one of her own bursting shells, and, until dispersed by the wind, by a great increase in volume of the dense cloud that brooded over the place she had occupied. It is doubtful whether any in the Japanese fleet saw her go, as little but the outline of her stem had been visible for some minutes.
It seems certain that the final hit caused a magazine explosion which sank the Borodino. There is some difference in the various reports as to the exact time when she sank, but it was probably at 1930. Only one man was saved from her crew of 855**. The remaining Russian ships made off to the southwest, while at 1928 Togo ordered the Japanese fleet to go north and fixed Utsuryo To on the north side of the Island of Matsushima for the rendezvous next morning. The wind had now somewhat fallen, but there was still a good deal of swell and in the fading twilight the Japanese torpedo craft could be seen coming up from north, south, and east through heavy seas. In this last action of the daylight battle, further hits were also made on the Orel, but she was not vitally injured. In the Japanese ships, the right fore 12-inch gun in Mikasa failed at 1804 from a premature, and as in Shikishima previously, the turret roof was damaged and the left gun put out of action until 1840. The Mikasa was also hit by a 12-inch shell at 1845 and by a 6-inch at 1826 which disabled one 6-inch gun permanently. A 12-inch shell hit the left fore 8-inch gun in the Nisshin at about 1900 and cut the gun in two, but otherwise there was no important damage to Togo's division in this phase of the battle.
The movements of Kamimura's division and the end of the Suvorov remain to be described. Shortly after 1730 Kamimura had chased some Russian cruisers to the southwest but they altered course to the northwestward and Kamimura was actually following them on an outside curve, which was latterly somewhat divergent, and he could not catch them. At 1803 he abandoned the chase and turned towards the estimated position of Togo's division. The details of his course alterations need not be related, and after passing the disabled Suvorov and Kamchatka, at which some of his ships fired, Kamimura at about 1830 sighted the rear of the Russian line at about 12,000 yards range on the port bow, and according to the report of his division, temporarily on a southward course. The Tokiwa reported sighting one Borodino class (Alexander), with the Sissoi, Navarin, and Nakhimov, and it seems that these three latter ships temporarily turned southward and then on to a northwesterly course at a greater distance from Togo's division than the rest of the Russian battleships. The southward turn was apparently made shortly after the Alexander first fell out of the line.
The Tokiwa was the first to open fire and by 1850 other armoured cruisers had followed with a slow fire at about 8,000 - 9,000 yards. Conditions of visibility were not good and except at 1915 when the three leading armoured cruisers fired at a Zhemchug class cruiser, targets are not identified in the reports. By 1930 firing ceased and at 2008 Kamimura rejoined Togo's division. It is doubtful if the Russians were much damaged in this action by the Japanese 2nd Division, and the Izumo was hit by a 12-inch shell at 1910 which might have caused considerable injuries if it had burst.
The Suvorov was now near the disabled repair ship Kamchatka. She was a complete wreck, still blazing, with flames out of most scuttles and ports, but still steaming slowly, though not under control, and able to fire two or three small [i.e., 3-inch] stern guns. As noted above, Kamimura's ships had fired a few rounds at her and from about 1830 most of the Japanese light cruisers were firing at her and the Kamchatka at ranges down to 1,300 yards. The Kasuga had, however, been compelled to make for shelter by a hit below the waterline, received earlier in the battle, and the Chitose had accompanied her, so that none of the light cruisers had heavier guns than 6-inch. At 1848 Kataoka's 5th Division, without the Matsushima, which had had a steering-gear breakdown, engaged the Suvorov and Kamchatka at 3,800 - 4,900 yards, aided by one light cruiser division, the others having steamed north. Kataoka's ships had heavy guns, and Corbett says that 12.6-inch shells kept bursting on the Suvorov, but this is not supported by the Japanese ammunition returns, which gave the heavy projectile expenditure for the entire battle as: Itsukushima, two 12.6-inch; Chin Yen, five 12-inch; Hashidate nil; and Matsushima, (temporarily absent), three 12.6-inch. The failure to make more use of the heavy guns in this division may have been due to the difficulty of working the older pattern barbette mountings in rough seas.
The Kamchatka sank at 1900 or soon afterwards, but the Suvorov was still under way as before. Kataoka had at this time a number of torpedo-boats in company, and the 11th Division of four 128-ft Schichau type boats attacked at 1920. They ran in at 20 knots to 300-350 yards without being fired at, and launched seven Winch torpedoes of which two or three hit. One torpedo was thought by the attackers to have exploded a magazine as black and yellow fumes poured out. The Suvorov heeled over to port and then capsized. For a short time she floated bottom up and at 1930 or just before, her bows lifted high in the air and she slid rapidly out of sight. Except for the few taken off with Rozhdestvensky, there were no survivors, and 928 were lost with her.
Thus by 1930 Togo had achieved a great victory: the Suvorov, Alexander, Borodino, and Osliabya sunk, the Sissoi and Navarin ... seriously damaged near the waterline, and the Orel much battered. The other five Russian ships in the line did not count for much in any case, but all except the Senyavin were damaged to some extent. In the Japanese armoured ships, three 12-inch and four 8-inch guns were out of action, but only the Asama had been seriously damaged.
During the night, the Japanese torpedocraft were to attack the surviving Russian ships. At dusk the swell was high enough to cause torpedo boats to roll through 50° or 60°, but this dropped during the night. Salt spray which had covered the boats during the day had impaired the eyesight of the crews.
The attacks were made as follows:
1st and 2nd Destroyer Divisions (totaling 9 boats) and the 9th Torpedo- boat Division (4 boats) originally to the northward, between 2010 and 2120.
3rd and 5th destroyer Divisions (8 boats), originally to the East, between 2030 and 2115 with one isolated attack at 2230.
1st, 10th, 15th, 17th, 18th Torpedo-Boat Divisions (20 boats), originally to the south, between 2110 and 2210.
Of the other Japanese torpedocraft, the 4th Destroyer Division (4 boats) did not attack until later and the 14th, 19th and 20th Torpedo Boat Divisions (11 boats) never located the Russian ships. The one serviceable boat of the 16th Division located a target after 0100 on the 28th but was driven off before she could fire torpedoes. The 11th Division (4 boats), which had attacked the Suvorov at 1920, returned to base for more torpedoes, and the 5th Torpedo Boat Division (four older boats) based on the Japanese coast, never found any Russian ships.
The Japanese attacks were somewhat confused from so many torpedo craft working independently, and there was no detailed plan of attack. 2 destroyers and 4 torpedo-boats of the attacking divisions never found a target, and in addition 3 destroyers and 3 torpedo-boats were involved in collisions, in which one torpedo boat (No. 69) was sunk. As one destroyer had made an attack before collision, the total number which actually fired torpedoes in these attacks was 13 destroyers and 17 torpedo boats. These launched, respectively, 23 18-inch and 31 14-inch torpedoes at ranges of about 200 to 650 or (exceptionally) 900 yards, and made three hits. A number of the Japanese torpedo craft were hit by Russian projectiles from rifle bullets upwards and some were damaged, but only two torpedo boats were sunk after they had made attacks (Nos. 34 and 35).
The Russians had been steaming in a southwesterly direction at nightfall, but at about 2030 Nebogatov, who now commanded the Russian fleet, altered course to N 23 E as previously ordered by the seriously wounded Rozhdestvensky. The ships in company with the Nikolai were the Orel, Apraksin, Senyavin, and the cruiser Izumrud. According to Nebogatov their speed was a little over 11 knots, and he had forbidden the use of any searchlights. He states that the Nikolai was attacked once unsuccessfully, but otherwise these ships appear to have escaped the Japanese. Some of the vessels astern used their searchlights and in so doing gave their positions away to the attacking torpedo craft. The Nakhimov was torpedoed in the earlier part of the attack, it is said by a destroyer which was mistaken for a Russian. She was hit on the starboard bow and though later attacks were avoided, she had to stop engines to make temporary repairs. Finally the Nakhimov made stern first for the nearest land, and reached the east coast of Tsushima at 0700 on the 28th.
The old cruiser Vladimir Monomakh is also said to have mistaken her attacker for a Russian destroyer. She was hit by a torpedo on the starboard side forward and also made for the coast of Tsushima. The Navarin had been seriously damaged near the waterline aft during the daylight battle and, according to a survivor, by 2100 on the 27th her stern had settled so much that water on the upper deck reached the after 12-inch turret. She was forced to stop and was then hit by a torpedo from a boat which had crept right under her stern. She was not completely disabled, however, and seems to have got under way again.
Enkvist with the Oleg, Aurora, and Zhemchug stated that several unsuccessful attacks were made on these three cruisers, but as all were three-funnelled and only two destroyers report firing torpedoes at three-funnel ships, this statement is open to doubt. There is, unfortunately, insufficient evidence to decide what Japanese torpedo craft attacked any particular Russian ship or to assign the three hits made with any certainty. So far the torpedo attacks had met with very limited success, but the 4th Destroyer Division, employing both their mines and torpedoes, were later to achieve a remarkable result. The Murasame had to return to base at 2330 as she was taking water aboard from the ricochet hit noted previously, but the other three saw a Russian ship at about 0200 next morning, about 600 yards away on their starboard bow. Their recognition signals were unanswered and each dropped her mines, 24 in all, about 300 yards ahead of the Russian ship. In a minute or two a dull thud and loud explosion were heard. This ship was the Navarin, whose few survivors thought that she had been torpedoed again. An explosion seemed to heave up the whole stern and then there was another to starboard amidships, and she capsized and sank. Only three were saved from her crew of 674.
The 4th Destroyer Division sped on and at about 1440 came up with the Sissoi, at which each of the three fired a torpedo in passing. One hit right aft, wrecking the rudder, but the Sissoi was able to steer by her engines. She had however been seriously damaged forward near the waterline during the daylight battle, and steamed for the coast of Tsushima.
Meanwhile Togo and Kamimura proceeded north[wards], untroubled by any attacks from the Russian destroyers. The Asama's flooding aft increased during the night, and she had to stop for 50 minutes at 0630, but was then able to continue. On the morning of 28 May, the ships with Nebogatov were located to the south of the main Japanese force. They comprised the Nikolai, Orel, Apraksin, and Senyavin with the cruiser Izumrud. The Japanese steamed to attack them and opened fire at 1034 at about 8,000 yards. After a few shots, their firing became general but the Russian ships did not reply. One or two hits were made on the Nikolai and it was then seen that the Russians had surrendered and firing ceased by 1050. The fast Izumrud had previously made off and got away. The rights and wrongs of this surrender cannot be discussed here, but the position of Nebogatov's squadron was quite hopeless. Of the four ships only the Orel was of any real value to the Japanese.
Of the Russian ships off Tsushima, the Nakhimov was taken by a Japanese destroyer and an auxiliary cruiser but her crew had opened the sea-valves and she sank at 0900. The Sissoi surrendered to three auxiliary cruisers and the Japanese attempted to take her in tow, but here again valves had been opened, and she went down at 1100. The old cruiser Vladimir Monomakh also surrendered, and kept afloat until 1430 when she sank.
The Ushakov alone remained of the twelve ships originally in the Russian line of battle. She had fallen far astern during the night from damage received in the daylight actions, but had not used her searchlights and had avoided torpedo attack. She was sighted to the south on the afternoon of the 28th and the Iwate and Yakumo overtook her at 1700 and called on her to surrender. This was ignored and at 1730 the action began at 9,800 yards. In a little over 20 minutes the Ushakov's guns were silenced and she had apparently stopped her engines. At 1807 there was an explosion, thought by the Japanese to be from scuttling charges, and in three minutes she went down. Neither Japanese ship was hit in this action, in which they fired 89 eight-inch and 278 six-inch shells.
Of the Russian light cruisers, Enkvist broke away to the south during the night of the 27th and the Oleg, Aurora and Zhemchug were eventually interned at Manila. The Izumrud got away when Nebogatov surrendered, but was wrecked on the coast north of Vladivostok, and the Svietlana was sunk on the 28th by the Japanese light cruisers Otowa and Niitaka. The fate of the old Vladimir Monomakh has already been noted, and the Dmitri Donskoi, after engaging Japanese light cruisers on the evening of the 28th, was attacked early that night off Matsushima by four Japanese destroyers which fired eight 18-inch torpedoes at 350-550 yards, apparently without success; [the Donskoi] was abandoned and scuttled soon after daybreak on the 29th.
The armed liner Ural, repair ship Kamchatka, and ocean tug Rus [all] were sunk on the 27th, and the hospital ships Orel and Kostroma captured. The armed transport Irtysh, badly damaged on the 27th, was run ashore on the Japanese coast, and the transport Korea and ocean tug Svir escaped to Shanghai, where they were interned. The armed transport Anadyr was missing for 45 days and then turned up in Madagascar, from whence she returned to Russia.
Of the nine Russian destroyers the Buistry, Bezuprechny and Gromky were sunk or driven ashore by the Japanese. The Buiny was scuttled and the Biedovy, to which Rozhedestvensky had been transferred, surrendered. The Blestiashchy was abandoned in a sinking condition and scuttled, and the Bodry, short of fuel, drifted about the Yellow Sea until found by a British steamer on 4 June and towed to Shanghai, where she was interned. Only the Grozny and Bravy, [together] with the armed yacht Almaz, reached Vladivostok.
The Russian casualties were 4,830 killed or drowned; 5,917 taken prisoner, of whom many were wounded; and 1,862 interned; a total of 12,609. Another 1,227 escaped to Vladivostok or Madagascar. The Japanese had 117 killed and 583 wounded, and only three torpedo-boats were sunk. Victory could scarcely have been more complete.
NOTES:
*According to some the Ushakov was astern of the Senyavin, which does not seem likely. The Navarin may have been ahead of the Sissoi.
**Though some accounts say there were four survivors from a total of 840.
Pertinent Web Pages
