Designed by Armstrong-Whitworth's chief architect, Tennyson dÉyncourt, and built at the firm's legendary Elswick Works, the superdreadnought HMS Agincourt was ordered by Brazil, sold to Turkey, and then siezed by Britain as war loomed. Fears about her structural integrity under the stress of firing all seven of her 12" turrets, proved unfounded. Though only in service for a few years, the 652-foot "Gin Palace" was beloved by her crews for her spacious interiors, smooth ride, and imperious profile. She gave a new dimension to the expression bristling with guns.
IN WHICH we compare the cost of the pre-WWI arms race from its origins in the Pre-Dreadnought Era to the last gun before the Armistice.
The chart below sets out capital ship and cruiser spending by GREAT BRITAIN, showing the ballooning expenditures on naval arms just before the Great War. Britain entered and left the era as the world's leading naval and imperial power. The numbers in the chart set out the cost of maintaining that pre-eminence. Prior to the Great War the cost in blood seemed sustainable. The scale of the cataclysm, the slaughter of half a generation of young European manhood, shook even such ardent imperialists as Rudyard Kipling, who lost his only son in the early part of he conflict. While Kipling survived into the Thirties, across the pond his friend and co-imperialist Theodore Roosevelt undewent a similar catharsis when his youngest son, an aviator in France, was shot down and killed. Weakened by age and tropical diseases contracted on a South American adventure, the ex-president survived his son by only a year.
But we digress. Britain may have staggered from the War as the leading imperial power, but the cost of winning virtually bankrupted her. Much of her imperial revenue would go to pay the war debt over the next 20 years. Naval expenditures, including those contracted before war was declared, made up a large portion of that debt. Numbers used herein are approximate with variation not exceeding 2 percent. "Initial cost" indicates only the cost to build, equip, arm, and commission these ships, trialed and ready for sea. Click the links in class names to view what all this money bought. For a technical and pictorial analysis of the dreadnought fleet, click here.
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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Class |
Year |
No. |
Cost in |
Initial |
Initial |
Unit cost |
Unit cost |
 |
|||||||
|
1906 |
1 |
£2,060,000 |
$9,991,000 |
37,726,016 | £2,060,000 |
$9,991,000 |
|
1907 |
3 |
£6,000,000 |
$29,100,000 |
109,881,600 |
£2,000,000 |
$9,700,000 |
|
1908 |
3 |
£6,000,000 |
$29,100,000 |
109,881,600 |
£2,000,000 |
$9,700,000 |
|
1909 |
1 |
£2,000,000 |
$9,700,000 |
41,491,065 |
£2,000,000 |
$9,700,000 |
|
1910 |
2 |
£3,460,000 |
$16,781,000 |
63,365,056 |
£1,730,000 |
$8,245,000 |
|
1912 |
4 |
£7,551,480 |
$36,624,678 |
138,294,784 |
£1,887,870 |
$9,156,170 |
|
1913 |
5 |
£9,728,345 |
$47,182,473 |
178,161,019 |
£1,945,669 |
$9,436,495 |
|
1914 |
4 |
£7,566,400 |
$7,566,400 |
138,568,023 |
£1,891,600 |
$9,174,260 |
|
1914 |
1 |
£2,200,000 |
$10,670,000 |
40,289,920 |
£2,200,000 |
$10,670,000 |
| 1914 |
1 |
£3,000,000 |
$14,550,000 |
54,940,800 |
£3,000,000 |
$14,550,000 |
|
1914 |
1 |
£2,500,000 |
$12,125,000 |
45,784,000 |
£2,500,000 |
$12,125,000 |
| 1915 |
5 |
£20,000,000 |
$20,000,000 |
366,272,000 |
£4,000,000 |
$19,400,000 |
|
1916 |
5 |
£20,000,000 |
$97,000,000 |
366,272,000 |
£4,000,000 |
$19,400,000 |
|
36 |
£94,066,225 |
$456,221,195 |
1,722,691,200 |
£4,000,000 |
$19,400,000 |
|
|
|||||||
|
1908 |
3 |
£5,256,000 |
$25,491,600 |
96,256,282 |
£1,752,000 |
$8,497,200 |
|
1909 |
3 |
£5,460,000 |
$26,481,000 |
99,992,256 |
£1,820,000 |
$8,827,000 |
|
1912 |
2 |
£4,174,000 |
$20,243,900 |
76,440,966 |
£2,087,000 |
$1,012,195 |
|
1913 |
1 |
£2,250,000 |
$10,912,500 |
41,205,600 |
£2,250,000 | $10,912,500 |
|
1914 |
1 |
£2,650,000 |
$12,852,500 |
48,531,040 |
£2,650,000 |
$12,852,500 |
| 1916 |
2 |
£7,000,000 |
$33,950,000 |
128,195,200 |
£3,500,000 |
$16,975,000 |
|
11 |
£26,790,000 |
$121,104,500 |
58,735,682,000 |
£2,270,000 |
$11,009,500 |
|
|
47 |
£111,856,225 |
$542,502,716 |
2,170,010,800 |
£2,341,200 |
$11,354,802 |
|
|
|||||||
|
1892 |
7 |
£5,740,000 |
$27,839,000 |
105,120,064 |
£820,000 | $765,058 |
|
1893 |
1 |
£850,000 |
$4,122,500 |
15,566,560 |
£850,000 |
$4,122,500 |
|
1894 |
2 |
£170,000 |
$8,245,000 |
31,133,120 |
£850,000 |
$4,125,500 |
|
1895 |
9 |
£8,100,000 |
$39,285,000 |
148,340,160 |
£900,000 |
$8,100,000 |
|
1898 |
1 |
£800,000 |
$3,880,000 |
14,650,880 |
£800,000 |
$3,880,000 |
|
1899 |
6 |
£5,400,000 |
$26,190,000 |
98,893,440 |
£900,000 |
$4,365,000 |
|
1900 |
3 |
£3,000,000 |
$14,550,000 |
54,940,800 |
£1,000,000 |
$4,850,000 |
|
1902 |
3 |
£3,000,000 |
$14,550,000 |
5,409,494 |
£1,000,000 |
$4,850,000 |
|
1904 |
2 |
£2,000,000 |
$9,700,000 |
36,626,200 |
£1,000,000 |
$4,850,000 |
|
1904 |
2 |
£1,900,000 |
$9,215,000 |
34,795,840 |
£950,000 |
$4,607,500 |
|
1903 | 6 |
£6,000,000 |
$29,100,000 |
109,881,600 |
£1,000,000 |
$4,850,000 |
|
1905 |
8 |
£12,000,000 |
$58,200,000 |
219,763,200 |
£1,500,000 |
$7,275,000 |
|
1908 |
2 |
£3,000,000 |
$14,550,000 |
549,408,000 |
£1,500,000 |
$7,275,000 |
Pre-Dreadnought |
52 |
£53,490,000 |
$259,426,500 |
924,653,664 | £1,028,654 |
$4,988,971 | |
 GRAND TOTAL: |
99 |
£182,544,435(£183 million) |
$885,340,480($.9 billion) |
3,541,361,986(3.5 billion) |
£ N/A | $ N/A | |
What did Britain get for its billion-dollar investment?
Its navy before the War was the world standard, outclassing any fleet afloat by more than 2:1 until the last years before war broke out, when Imperial Germany launched a spirited challenge. What ensued is documented by the numbers in the chart above. Already-high naval spending more than doubled, and the cost of a battleship more than doubled as well. Stated briefly, Britannia ruled the waves prior to 1906 with 50-odd pre-dreadnought battleships and a vast fleet of cruisers and support craft. She spent some 53.5 millions to do this between 1890 and 1906, equivalent to $260M U.S. After 1906, she dominated the waves despite the Kaiser's competition, but, having initiated the dreadnought revolution herself, was forced into spending 111 millions essentially to maintain the same relative position. This was the equivalent of more than half a trillion U.S. dollars at 1914 values (roughly equal to $35 trillion today). Half a trillion remains a tremendous sum even today -- equal to he annual Pentagon budget as presented on paper. It was an even more considerable burden in those times when the pound sterling ruled the money markets as Britannia ruled the waves. The cost of a first-class warship advanced from a bit under £1M in 1892 to over £4M in 1912-13, roughly equal to $19.4M US at 1914 valuation, or $1.4B in today's money.
The initiator of the dreadnought arms race was the uniformed head of the Admiralty, Jacky Fisher (right). In any gallery of colorful Victorians/Edwardians, Fisher would occupy a special place. Completely dedicated to improving the Royal Navy through a lifetime of service, Fisher displayed a strange blend of altruism and egotism. These elements of his personality were in constant play and sometimes influenced his better judgment, especially in his later years. He will always be remembered as the father of the Dreadnought, the warship that revolutionized naval design overnight and set the stage for a new arms race of unprecedented sweep and scope. Not to mention expense.
The Dreadnought was meant to showcase Britain's advanced marine engineering and warn off would-be competitors, particularly the Germans, who had been building up their navy for for more than ten years at the time Dreadnought's keel was laid.
However, the challenge had the opposite effect. Far from cowing other would-be naval powers into surrender, the new ship and the dreadnought battlecruisers that quickly followed stimulated demand. The dreadnought as a ship type was a sensation, given much attention in the press, both popular and trade. Governments around the globe soon felt pressure to acquire dreadnoughts of their own. Since many of these ships were purchased from Britain's accomplished shipbuilders, the rush of orders was great for business. By 1909-12, Britain's yards and armories had reached their capacity and were scrambling to keep up with orders. They could not fill an order for 24 12" guns for a new class of Japanese dreadnoughts; would the Emperor accept eight 12" and two dozen 10" instead?
While this was a nice problem to have, the increasing pressure on the arms buildup was starting to be alarming. Far from renouncing her claim, Germany redoubled her efforts to best the Royal Navy. Tirpitz announced a new goal (he announced a new goal every three or four years, and it never grew smaller): 49 battleships, 28 battlecruisers, and 100,000 men by 1920. This would have put Germany's fleet at, or near, parity with Britain's. While it is unlikely German industry could have produced so many ships in the given time, there was no guarantee it could not; it did meet the previous target of 19 dreadnought battleships and 7 battlecruisers by mid-1914. Tirpitz' fiery rhetoric left little doubt of his determination to build to the last plate and spend to the last pfennig to outdo England. He did not hesitate to fan the flames of Anglophobia in order to get the necessary support. Germany spent aggressively -- recklesslessly -- on her fleet in these years, borrowing the money to do it rather than wait through the time-consuming process of voting higher taxes. With such noisy competition right across the North Sea, it became politically impossible for any government in London not to vow to outdo the Germans. Whether this heated competition actually made anyone safer is open to debate. The hateful rhetoric emanating from both sides certainly made nobody sleep more soundly.
Comparing the two countries' spending in the dreadnought period only, Germany spent the equivalent of £57M to build 26 dreadnought-type ships, including three that were finished after Jutland and never saw action. Britain outspent the Germans nearly 2:1, with £110M spent through 1915 (£129M through war's end, including the large light cruisers and the Hood ). With her much larger shipbuilding industry, Britain got more pop for the pound: her ships cost about 25% less than comparable German-built vessels. For her prodigious outlay, Britain received 47 dreadnought-type ships (51 counting the large light cruisers and the Hood, which did not complete until 1920). Germany completed two 15"-gunned ships in mid-1916, too late for Jutland; Britain had ten 15" battleships in commission by that time, plus three 15" battlecruisers building, three large-light cruisers and four coastal monitors armed with the new weapon. Even when the losses at Jutland were tallied, Britain had a convincing superiority in numbers. As the war ground on, with the Germans blockaded in port, Britain had a tangible advantage in seamanship and morale, too.
One could argue that the enormous naval spending of the German Empire sapped the strength of her armies just enough that she could not consummate her victory over France in 1914-18. But one must consider the converse argument: did British naval spending detract from the capability of the BEF during the War? Could a few more divisions have turned the tide at Mons and prevented the rout after the Battles of the Frontiers? Such questons are purely academic, however; the British felt honor bound to defend their briny turf. One cannot imagine a situation in which a British government at this time would voluntarily relinquish its naval pre-eminence. Germany, however, was a different matter. Like the tatty German Empire oversesas, the navy was not a necessity, but rather a matter of appearance, of pride in being a first-rate power. England had one; France had one; why not Germany? Undoubtedly the Imperial Navy was a fine service, packed with innovations and survivable ships, crewed by proud professionals, and with a gunnery record that put Britain's to shame -- in all, a legitimate source of national pride. Still, it was not a core element of German national identity. Its removal after the Versailles Treaty did not threaten Germany's existence. The navy was in the nature of a hobby for the Kaiser and a few enthusiasts, and a way of goading British anxieties (more an obsession than a hobby).
By the closing guns of WWI, fully half the dreadnought fleet was out of date. Britain and the other naval powers forged ahead with their latest inventions, and a new arms race was in the making, this time between the victors of the Great War. Truly gargantuan outlays would have been required to build the ships already on their drawing boards. Japan submitted a budget request that was fully 50% of anticipated national spending. Truly, only the U.S., fat from financing the winning side, could afford this indulgence. The result was the Washington Treaty for Naval Disarmament, which went into effect in 1923. Virtually all those older dreadnoughts, and even older pre-dreadnoughts, went to the torch in the next few years. The newer ships, particularly the 15" variety, became the core of the British fleet during the interwar years and on into WWII. Several of them perished gallantly in that great conflict: Hood, Barham, Repulse. By that time the battleship had assumed a different rôle, but proved adaptable to new uses. Versatile and dependable, this great weapons system was indispensable for escort work and shore bombardment; if no longer the prima donna, still an important component of Allied victory.
One hopes lessons may be drawn from history. When one considers the much greater value of small units of money a hundred-odd years ago, the naval spending was astounding. The pound of 1910 was worth roughly £70 in today's currency, but this glib equivalency understates the disparity in value. Money simply went further in purchasing the necessities of life -- and some of the luxuries. A standard workingman's famly budget for 1920 was £1/2/6, or less than £275 a year. The shilling went much further before the considerable inflation of the War: inflation that averaged 14.6% a year for five years. In 1910, rent for a small house was 3/6 to 5s a week outside London. In 1907 a pensioner living alone could eke out a threadbare existence on 5 shillings a week, the rough equivalent of £17 today; in 1914 Prime Minister Herbert Asquith was paid a salary of £5,000 per annum (£325,000 today). When one considers that a pound of butter cost 1 shilling tuppence, 20 pounds of potatoes could be had for 10d, a loaf of bread for 2½d; that a dozen eggs went for a shilling and a pound of meat for 10d, the true magnitude of a billion pounds sterling becomes evident. In the United States in the same period, workmen toiled 12 hours a day, 6 days a week to earn $500 a year, and a good wage for a college graduate was $750 a year ($55,000 in 2009 USD). A comfortable wage for an unskilled American worker was 20 cents an hour ($14/hr today), though many worked longer hours to earn their 16 or 17 ($11-12); those who wished to better their earnings would find it cost $150 to attend a business college for two years ($1,575 today).A quart of milk was 5 cents; subway fare was likewise a nickel; a pound of butter cost a quarter; gasoline was 7 cents a gallon; bread was 5 cents a loaf. A brick row house could be had for $2,700-3,200; a 2½-storey mixed-use frame house with living quarters upstairs went for $5,000-7,000. A new automobile in 1911 cost $850. Viewed in this context, a $20M battleship appears as a king's ransom, let alone a $3.5B expenditure on new ships over 25 years (averaging $140M a year). During the 30 years ending in 1909, the U.S. government paid $3.5B for every category except the military, or 28.5% of the budget. In the same period it lavished $12.2M on the Army and Navy altogether, or 3.5 times as much. But even this hefty expenditure paled into insignificance beside what it took to fight the Great War. In two years of conflict, the U.S. Treasury laid out $21,850,000,000 -- an amount equal to 20 times the prewar national debt. On top of that, Uncle Sam made available $8,850,000,000 to finance the war efforts of his European allies -- staggered, shell-shocked, and sucked dry after three years of all-out "war of attrition." If one is moved to pry into prewar U.S. government spending, she will find that from 1879-1909, military spending (including pensions and interest on the debt) consumed over 71% of the national budget on average. Admittedly taxes were low -- there was no income tax until 1913 -- but do we really want to return to this troglodyte form of government, as neocons and Tea Baggers propose? Few now remain who remember what life was like for the unemployed before 1933; aside from Church charities, there was no safety net, and many a good man or woman was reduced to begging, selling his/her body, or starving in the streets of cities and towns across the U.S. In hard times, life for the poor could be nasty, brutish, and short. One who was "down on his luck" might evoke no more concern than a dead horse that had collapsed after being worked to death. In the climate of today, when the last shreds of the safety net are under attack, those medieval conditions could easily recur.
In the first 15 years of the 20th century the faith in naval expansion as an unqualified and necessary good apparently was shared in the councils of all developed nations. That faith is testimony to the wide-reaching influence of the American theorist Adm. Alfred Thayer Mahan (above left), whose The Influence of Sea Power Upon History was bedside reading for Fisher and Tirpitz alike, and for their respective sovereigns as well. In their day, it was taken as gospel that national greatness followed from having a great navy, and that without a powerful navy no nation need be taken seriously. Hence the dabbling in dreadnoughts by minor powers in South America and Asia which could ill afford such luxuries. But to return to our thread: the disastrous results of military overspending in the past send a cautionary note to us today, possibly making thoughtful observers question whether (for instance) the U.S. really needs a military ten times as strong as any potential opponent, costing half a trillion dollars a year exclusive of its major operations (conservatively estimated at an additional $5B a month). One might ask also whether borrowing the money to maintain such a military is a wise move -- whether such indebtedness contributes to national weakness rather than strength, to inhibitions on policy rather than freedom to act. Issues to ponder!
Sources for financial data: Brassey's Annual, 1882-1920; Jane's Fighting Ships, 1906 and 1914 eds.; Web article by Barry Slemmings (Warspite), How Much Did a Warship Cost?, and statistics quoted on worldwar1.co.uk Cost of living statistics from a The Pittsburgh Survey: The Steel Workers by J. A. Fitch (1910), Measuring Worth (dot) Com, & TFP Project (dot) org. USG spending figures and additional cost of living data from the Report of the Massachusetts Commission on the Cost of Living (1910).
How the Figures Are Presented: Costs quoted are for an entire class of ships; from left to right in German marks, equivalent U.S. dollars and British pounds at 1914 valuation; then in the columns furthest to the right, the average cost per ship in each class, stated in U.S. dollars and British pounds at 1914 valuation. In actuality costs varied significantly from ship to ship even within a class; our numbers are sums of the actual ship costs where available; the average costs may be misleading in some cases. GM indicates gold mark (Imperial German currency), worth about 23 cents U.S. at the time. Of course, the cost of new capital ships was nowhere near the entire cost of the naval arms race; but especially as the dreadnought competition heated up, they were a driver of increased spending across the board. Thus we have captioned them initial cost. Watch this site for further analyses on the moneys consumed by the naval arms race by Great Britain, France, and the United States as our boys with the green eye-shades and slide rules continue crunching the numbers for BBB's high command.
Relevant Weblinks
- Narrative of the Pre-WWI Naval Arms Race
- Analysis of German Naval Spending, 1891-1916
- Timeline of the Arms Race, 1889-1912 - from Churchill College, Cambridge
- Illustrated List of British Dreadnoughts
- BBB's Picture History of the Imperial German Nav
- Gallery of Battleship Models from SteelNavy.com
- Notable Naval Battles, 1860-1918
- The Influence of Sea Power on History, 1660-1783, 12th ed. - Project Gutenberg e-book
- Set Course for BBB Site Nav
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